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Family Income and Child Outcomes: The 1990 Cocoa Price Shock in Cote d’Ivoire
Abstract
We study the drastic cut of the administered cocoa producer price in
1990 Cote d’Ivoire and investigate the extent to which cocoa producers’
children suffered from this severe income shock in terms of school enrollment,
increased labor, height stature and sickness. Comparing pre-crisis (1986-
1988) data and post-crisis (1993) data, we propose a difference-in-difference
within-village strategy in order to identify the causal effect of family income
on children outcomes. We find a strong impact of family income variation
for the four variables we examine.
1 Introduction
In many low-income countries and in Africa in particular, performances with re-
gard to child education and health are still very much disappointing (see Appendix
1). While the disease-prone environment and the low availability and quality of
infrastructures bear a large responsibility in this situation, on the demand side low
parental resources also constitute a direct limiting factor. A large body of econo-
metric works has already addressed the issue of estimating the impact of parental
income on child outcomes in developing countries. This literature has long recog-
nized that the statistical correlations between these two latter variables are merely
an indirect and potentially biased reflection of the causal impact of income (see,
e.g., Blau 1999; Behrman and Knowles 1999). One reason is the contamination
of income indicators by relatively large measurement errors or idiosyncratic tran-
sient components. Another reason is the possible endogeneity of parental income
due to omitted variables: Some unobservable preferences and resources may si-
multaneously determine parental income, child work, child schooling, and child
care.
Randomized experiments are a first answer to this endogeneity problem. The
evaluations of the famous Mexican conditional cash transfer program Progresa
2
have revealed a strong and causal sensitivity of school enrollment to the transfers
delivered to families that send their children to school (e.g., Schultz, 2004; De
Janvry and al. 2004). However, the impacts of unconditional income variations and
of negative income shocks, the impacts on other outcomes than schooling such as
health, and the influence of the socioeconomic context (e.g. Africa vis-a-vis Latin
America) are still not well known. In the absence of randomized experiments, a
bunch of recent works exploits the income variability generated by macroeconomic
crises (Thomas and al., 2004), commodity price changes (Edmonds and Pavcnik
2005; Kruger, 2007), shocks on production (Jensen, 2000; Beegle, Dehejia and
Gatti, 2006; Banerjee et al., 2007) or targeted policy reforms (like that of the
South-African pension-system: Duflo 2000 and 2003; Case, 2001; Edmonds 2006)
in a variety of contexts. Many of these works suggest that income has direct
and large effects on child outcomes, and are suggestive of the strong liquidity
constraints that weight on poor households (with the exception of Kruger, op.cit.,
in the case of child labor in Brazil).
Our work pertains to this family. We study the drastic cut of the adminis-
tered cocoa producer price in 1990 Cote d’Ivoire and look at the extent to which
cocoa producers’ children suffered from this severe income shock in terms of school
enrollment, increased labor, height stature and sickness. Cote d’Ivoire is the world
leading exporter of cocoa beans. In the period 1985-1994, cocoa beans exports
amounted to more than one third of Ivorian total exports; as such, the Cote
d’Ivoire economy was and still is highly dependent on cocoa international prices.
As those latter were plummeting over the 1980s, the parastatal marketing board
finally decided to halve the producer price in 1990, from 400 to 200 CFA francs
per kilogram. We exploit two datasets from nationally representative large sam-
ple household surveys that were implemented before and after the cocoa crisis, in
1986-89 and 1992-93 respectively.
We implement two kinds of identification strategies of the impact of income
shocks. Our preferred strategy is a double difference, whereby we compare the
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evolution of outcomes of children living in cocoa producing households with that
of children living in other agricultural households. We even compare children
living in the same villages, in order to absorb the potential variation in supply-
side factors. Of course, given the weight of cocoa production in the Cote d’Ivoire
economy, the comparison group (non-cocoa farmers’ children) is also affected by
the cocoa crisis, so that we do not measure the overall impact of the cocoa crisis
but only use it in order to identify the causal impact of a negative private income
shock. A second identification strategy exploits the weight of cocoa production in
the district of birth of the children, in keeping with previous works that also rely
on regional variation (Jensen, 2000; Kruger, 2007; Banerjee et al., 2007). This
second strategy offers results that are broadly consistent with the first; Income
matters as regards parental decisions to invest in the health and education of their
children.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 proposes
a very simple theoretical model of school enrollment that illustrates the main
endogeneity bias that may affect the econometric estimation of the causal impact
of household income on children outcomes. Section 3 presents the data and the
construction of the main variables. Section 4 describes the socioeconomic context
of the natural experiment and some suggestive descriptive statistics about the long-
term consequences of the cocoa shock. Section 5 presents our two double-difference
identification strategies. Section 6 examines the assumptions that underlie the
validity of our identification strategies and provides supportive evidence in their
favor. Section 7 presents the results. Section 8 discusses distinct aspects of our
results regarding the influence of the local context. Section 9 summarizes and
concludes.
2 Theoretical Framework and Identification Issues
We here write the simplest microeconomic model of school enrollment decision, in
order to raise the main identification questions that we have to solve out. A child
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care model (including nutrition and medical expenditures) could be devised the
same way. Let us consider families (indexed by i) which have to decide whether
they send their children to school (Si = 1) or not (Si = 0), depending on their
ability to pay the costs of schooling (γi) and on the impact of the schooling decision
on their utility. Parents determine the allocation of their permanent income (Yi)
between consumption (Ci) and schooling in order to maximize a utility function
U(Ci, Si). The maximization is performed subject to a budget constraint Ci +
γiSi = Yi. Assuming that U is concave and additively separable (U(Ci, Si) =
Cαi + βiSi) and that γi remains small with respect to Yi, it is not difficult to check
that:
Si = 1⇐⇒ U (Yi − γi, 1) > U (Yi, 0)⇐⇒ lnYi > 1
1− α ln
(
αγi
βi
)
(1)
Parents send their children to school if and only if their income is sufficiently
high for the impact of schooling cost on family consumption to be small enough.
One straightforward extension of this school enrollment model is to assume that
the net cost γi/βi depends on the characteristics of the child and that the parental
decision is taken in two steps: in a first step, they evaluate the optimal timing of
their children’s schooling (i.e., the timing that minimizes γi/βi) and, in a second
step, they choose to send or not their children to school depending on whether
condition (1) holds true or not. In particular, we will consider that the optimal
timing is not necessarily the same for cocoa producers compared to other farmers.
It should however be acknowledged that such a model is more adapted to explaining
delayed entry, i.e. the probability of not being schooled on time (at 5 years old, at
the first compulsory primary level called CP1) or at any age conditional on a given
timing. It is less suited to explaining school dropouts, as the model should then be
dynamic and include past school experience into the net cost of school enrollment.
However, the data will not allow us to distinguish late entries and early drop-
outs, unlike Bommier and Lambert (2002), as the age of entry into school and
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the school curriculum of children are not available. Moreover, dynamic models
raise identification difficulties that are rather difficult to overcome (Cameron and
Heckman, 1998). Therefore, we will simply analyze the probability of attending
school in a given year and relate it to the household current income, but will
consider the heterogeneity of the income treatment with respect to such observable
variables as the age of children, as well as to their gender, relation to the household
head and birth order. To specify our empirical models, we will assume that the
net cost γi/βi of schooling can be expressed as a linear function of (a) the child’s
exogenous characteristics Xi such as her/his gender and age, (b) head’s education
and other household characteristics Hi, (c) location characteristics Vi, and (d)
child or household unobservable determinants εi.
Si = I(aYi +Xib1 +Hib2 + Vi + εi > 0) (2)
where I(x > 0) is a dummy that takes the value 1 whenever x is positive. From an
econometric point of view, the main problem for estimating (2) is the potential en-
dogeneity of income, parental education and some other household characteristics.
In this paper, we are only interested in the estimation of the causal effect of the
former. The reasons for such endogeneity of income are the classical simultaneity,
omission and measurement errors biases. A first example of simultaneity bias is
the fact that child schooling and household income are jointly determined through
the decision regarding child labor; in other words, the more a child works, the lower
his/her schooling enrollment but the higher the total household income (downward
bias). Another omission bias is income being correlated with unobserved parental
abilities and parental preferences towards education, which could either positively
influence child schooling (upward bias) or else negatively (downward bias) if skilled
parents put their children to work early in order to transmit their savoir-faire. Be-
sides, richer parents may locate in villages with a better school (Vi), thus implying
a relatively lower net cost γi/βi (upward bias). Lastly, our measure of income
could be subject to measurement errors leading to attenuation bias (downward
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bias). Therefore, the identification of our model requires the construction of in-
strumental variables which are correlated with household income but uncorrelated
with unobserved family-specific factors and measurement errors.
3 Data
Our main sources of data are three Cote d’Ivoire Living Standards Surveys (CILSS)
from 1986 to 1988, and the Enqueˆte Prioritaire (EP) 1993, conducted by the
Institut National de la Statistique of Cote d’Ivoire with the support of the World
Bank. As we are only interested in the comparison of children between the pre-
crisis and the post-crisis period, we stack all the household data for 1986-1988 and
label them 1988.
Regarding children outcomes, the surveys ask the same questions about
school enrollment and child work during the previous year. Our definition of child
work includes child labor on domestic farms and in domestic businesses, but not
household chores since there are no related data. As already noted, the surveys
unfortunately do not provide details on the children school curriculum nor on age
of entry into school.1 With respect to health outcomes, the questions about sick-
ness episodes during the preceding month are the same, and height and weight are
measured for every child between 6 months and 5 years. We can then construct
height-for-age Z-scores following the procedure recommended by the World Health
Organization.2
In each of the two datasets, we are able to define in an homogeneous way the
1Moreover, the question ”Have you ever been at school?” that is asked in 1993 is formulated
in a much wider manner in 1988 as ”Have you ever followed any kind of training?” and thus
includes apprenticeship and koranic schools. Likewise, level attained can not be used as informal
curricula are not distinguished. The questions on literacy are not comparable either as the ability
of reading and writing is asked without any precision in 1993, whereas it is characterized as the
capacity to read a newspaper and write a letter in 1988.
2See WHO Multicentre Growth Reference Study Group (2006). Details of such calculations
are available on the Internet WHO website: http://www.who.int/childgrowth/software/en/
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group of cocoa producing households, whether they are landowners with tenants
who grow cocoa trees, or landowners or sharecroppers who directly collect cocoa (at
least 1 kg within the year). As the district (”de´partement”) of birth is available
in each survey, we are also able to know whether a child was born in a cocoa-
producing district or not.
Our preferred income variable is consumption per capita at 1988 prices; con-
sumption is much better measured than income in that kind of surveys (see e.g.
Deaton, 1997). Our consumption concept includes consumption of own food pro-
duction, and all cash expenditures including an imputed housing rent, but exclud-
ing very infrequent durable goods acquisition and health expenditures.3 Income
available for consumption corresponds to the ex-post income obtained once coping
strategies have been implemented to mitigate the ex-ante cocoa income cut: in-
crease in labor supply, dissaving and sale of assets, borrowing, etc. Despite these
coping strategies, what follows will show that liquidity constraints still weight
heavily on the welfare of the children.
4 The Cocoa Shock
So as to solve income endogeneity, we use the natural experiment provided by
the exogenous changes in cocoa producer prices in Cote d’Ivoire over the period
1986-1993. From independence till the mid-1970’s, Cote d’Ivoire has experienced
dramatic growth thanks to the development of cocoa exports in a context of ris-
ing primary commodity prices. Migration from Northern regions and neighboring
countries (Burkina-Faso and Mali) was encouraged in order to provide the neces-
sary workforce to this expanding sector. The expansion of production also relied
on the extensive exploitation of new forest areas in the South-Western part of the
country. The producer price was administered by the state-owned marketing board
3We also used the cash expenditures variable excluding consumption of own food production,
knowing that the cocoa income loss directly affects cash income. The results obtained with this
latter are largely consistent with those obtained with total consumption.
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(the ”Caisstab”), which fixed it much below the international price: for instance,
over the period 1974-1980, the producer price only represented 45% of the export
price. The benefits of the Caisstab constituted extra-budgetary resources which
were extensively used to finance the fiscal deficit, aside to the taxes also levied
on cocoa exports. This allowed the Ivorian government to pay high wages to its
skilled civil servants and to fund a wide expansion of the education sector (Azam,
1993). Starting from a very low colonial level, Cote d’Ivoire managed to catch
up with the neighboring Ghana where the British colonial ruler had much more
developed education. From 1979, the decline in international cocoa prices and the
subsequent increasing deficits of the Caisstab designated the end of the ”Ivorian
Miracle”. Many public investments that had been financed through international
debt proved to be at the same time not very efficient. Cote d’Ivoire progres-
sively entered in a period of financial crisis and adjustment that would last almost
twenty years (Berthe´lemy and Bourguignon, 1996; Cogneau and Mesple´-Somps,
2003). After a short-lived rebound in 1985-1986, and despite a governmental at-
tempt to influence international cocoa prices by rationing cocoa exports in 1987,
those latter kept falling. In June 1989, the cocoa producer price was abruptly
cut for the first time in 25 years, first from 400 to 250 CFA francs per kilogram;
then in 1990, it was purely halved to 200 CFA francs. In 1994, a new rebound
of international prices, combined with the CFA franc devaluation, authorized to
increase at new the producer price. In 1998, the Caisstab was dismantled and the
cocoa trade liberalized. But this is another story (Grimm, 2004).
Between 1986 and 1993, we expect cocoa-producers’ income to have fallen
much more than the rest of the population. In particular, 1986, 1987 and 1988
have been years of high yields and high prices for cocoa producers while they
were years of low yields and low prices for coffee producers, and years of low
prices for staple food producers (Jones and Ye, 1997). After 1990, yields remained
high for cocoa producers, while the prices of other agricultural products remained
stable. In order to examine the income consequences of the shock, we define a
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treatment group, the sample of cocoa-producing households (whether landowner
or tenant, as already stated above), and a comparison group, the sample of non-
cocoa agricultural households (defined as being households whose head is a farmer
but do not produce cocoa at all). Even if we work with the whole national sample in
order for our two IV strategies to be comparable (see thereafter), we set aside non-
agricultural households by including specific dummies for them. Figure 1 confirms
that cocoa households’ average income has fallen more than the one of their non-
cocoa agricultural counterparts, by 36% against 24%, although each category has
been very much affected by the cocoa-induced macroeconomic crisis.4
We now look at whether cocoa households have comparatively more de-
creased their investments in their offspring’s health or education. In the case of
education, let us first point out that assessing the long-term consequences of the
cocoa shock turns out to be difficult. Indeed, the data does not allow tracing back
the type of household (cocoa vs. non-cocoa) where an adult individual actually
lived at school age years. This precludes comparing definitive educational attain-
ments (literacy, completed primary level) between treated adults and non-treated
adults. In the case of health however, average differences in height-for-age deficits
mirror the past investments in child care from the parents and the quantity and
quality of nutrition received, especially at very young ages (Martorell and Habicht,
1986). In particular, a height-for-age Z-score lower than -2 means that a child has
experienced a severe growth failure, and this kind of accident is widely considered
as a health handicap in adult age. We actually focus on the analysis of height
stature on 2-5 year-old children. First, we only have anthropometric data from 6
months to 5. Second, it can be argued that differences that are due to distinct
investments between 0 and 2 usually better show up at ages 2-5 (Moradi 2006).
Table 1 anticipates on econometric results and presents the double differences
4For the whole sample, our estimated consumption per capita loss between 1986-88 and 1993
amounts to 28%, which is consistent with estimates from Maddison (2003) indicating a 27% fall
of real GDP per capita.
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of children outcomes and household income that we shall exploit later on. It shows
that in 1993 the situation of children living in cocoa households has significantly
deteriorated in comparison with children living in other farming households: they
are less often enrolled at school and more often working, they have become rela-
tively smaller and are more often declared as sick. The two figures about schooling
and stunting suggest that the cocoa price shock might have had very serious con-
sequences on the capabilities of the children living in cocoa-producing districts or
cocoa-producing households. Although we can not definitively prove it, it is fairly
possible that some minimal education was not received and could not be recovered;
the same holds for the small stature inherited from stunting in that it reflects an
irreversibly diminished health capital. The cohorts who were the most at risk in
terms of primary education or nutrition and health care in the beginning 1990s
could be doomed to carry all along their life the handicaps brought about by this
unfavorable period. It remains to be checked whether the parental income channel
can credibly explain these long-term consequences.
Before focusing on this channel, it is worth pointing out that the cocoa price
shock had potentially two distinct effects: one was to decrease the returns to
cocoa production and the relative price of labor in that sector (for both adults and
children), and another was to decrease the income of cocoa-producing regions or
households. The former price effect could be expected to have decreased labor in
cocoa-production from both children and adults. Let us first notice that no child
labor decrease is observed, and that 9-15 year-old children are rather observed
to work more in cocoa-producing districts and households (this of course does not
mean that they work more in cocoa production). Further, if child labor substitutes
at least partially for time spent in school, and if adult labor substitutes at least
partially for time spent in child care, the price effect should have led to an increase
in school enrolment and in health status. Here again, this is not what is observed.
We are therefore led to consider that this price/time effect is by far dominated
by the income effect. Our econometric strategy will not allow us to separately
11
identify this price effect; but, as its consequences are theoretically the opposite
of the income effect, we argue that disregarding it only means underestimating
the income effect. This latter effect in fact reflects a variety of interconnected
behavioral responses: while liquidity constraints lead to save school and health
care costs, coping strategies also lead to increase child labor. In fact, the two right
columns of Table 1 reveal that, once district or village level externalities have
been canceled out, the former effect is most obvious for children between 5 and
11 year-old 5, while the latter strongly holds for 9-15 year-old children. Results
not shown indeed indicate that child labor increases are not significant under 8
years old, whereas school attendance is also again not significantly affected above
12: When compared with other agricultural households in the same districts or
villages, cocoa-producing households mainly seem to have postponed the school
enrolment of their youngest children and to have asked more work from the oldest.
Whatever the age of children between 2 and 15, health outcomes have fallen. The
comparison of the ”pooled” and ”within” (districts or villages) columns of Table 1
also indicates that the local context plays a greater role for school enrolment and
work than for health outcomes.
5 Identification Strategies for the Income Effect
The previous section has already circumscribed the core of our IV strategy. The
price shock has had a relatively more negative impact on the income of cocoa
households relatively to our control group of non-cocoa agricultural households,
who would have in turn relatively less invested in the education and health of their
children. Therefore, we propose to instrument household income with belonging
to a cocoa-producing household rather than to another farming household in 1993,
5We calculated that the poorest families (1st quartile) would spend an average of 2% of their
income on each 5-11 year-old child attending school. 49% was spent on books, 26% on uniforms
and only 14% on fees and parental donations.
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i.e. implement a difference-in-difference instrumental variable strategy (DiD-IV).6
We estimate the following econometric model, that we label IV1, for child i in
household h in village v at time t :
Sihvt = aYhvt +Xhvtb+ δCocoa+ θNagri+ ϑNagri1993 + Vvt + uihvt (3)
Yihvt = a′Cocoa1993 +Xhvtb′ + δ′Cocoa+ θ′Nagri+ ϑ′Nagri1993 + V ′vt + u
′
ihvt (4)
where S is the outcome, Y household income, and X a set of child and household
exogenous variables (including a constant). Cocoa and Nagri are dummy vari-
ables respectively taking the value 1 if the household produces cocoa or is not in
agriculture, and Nagri1993 interacts Nagri with a dummy for the year 1993. V
is a vector of village-time fixed effects (see Figure 3 for the spatial distribution of
villages over the map of Cote d’Ivoire), and u is a residual. Cocoa1993 indicates
if the household produces cocoa in 1993, and is our instrumental variable. As
such, it must be reasonably correlated with income in 1993, and uncorrelated with
the residual in the main equation: once we control for a certain set of observable
variables, belonging to the treatment group in 1993 should not affect our outcome
(S) this same year through another channel than income (Y).
When translated in the experimentalist lexicon, our identification strategy
tries to simulate a counterfactual change of 5 to 7 years in the date of birth for chil-
dren living in cocoa-producing households (or born in cocoa-producing districts,
see thereafter our IV2 estimator). Conditionally to a list of controls, in particu-
lar geographical ones, we pretend to manipulate family income and only family
income when ”cocoa children” are compared to ”non-cocoa children” over this 5
to 7 years period covering the cocoa price shock. Whether non-cocoa farmers are
indirectly affected by the cocoa crisis or simultaneously affected by a specific price
6As we stack 1986, 1987 and 1988 data, we rely on a simple comparison between only two
periods, before and after the shock. Therefore, the double-difference strategy should not be
affected by the bias linked to the autocorrelation of outcomes across time that have been pointed
out by Bertrand, Duflo and Mullainathan (2004).
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or income shock is irrelevant, provided that the evolution of the difference in out-
comes between cocoa and non-cocoa children is only affected by the evolution of
their relative income over the period 1986-1993.
We also implement a second instrumental variable strategy for comparative
purposes. Instead of instrumenting by ”belonging to a cocoa household in 1993”
(the strategy which we label IV1), we instrument by the density of cocoa produc-
tion in the district of birth interacted with a 1993 year dummy (IV2). Density
of cocoa production is captured by a set of three variables: a dummy distinguish-
ing non-cocoa districts, and the level and squared level of cocoa production per
squared kilometers in each district as measured by administrative statistics in the
pre-crisis period (1987-89). We replace Cocoa1993 by the set CDDB1993 (for Cocoa
Density in District of Birth) corresponding to this latter definition. Then, since we
can no longer consider village-time fixed effects, as they would absorb too much
of the instrument variation, we just include a time dummy:
Sihvt = aYhvt +Xhvtb+ CDDBd+ λt+ uihvt (5)
Yihvt = CDDB1993a′ +Xhvtb′ + CDDBd′ + λ′t+ u′ihvt (6)
When referred to the previous literature, this strategy echoes the exploitation
of local aggregate shocks instead of individual shocks (Jensen, 2000; Kruger, 2007;
Banerjee et al., 2007). As Figure 3 reveals, the cocoa-producing districts are
all located in the Southern part of the country; in the South, dark grey and
black areas then distinguish low cocoa density and high cocoa density districts. It
should however be stressed that the district of birth can influence private household
income but also a whole bunch of contextual factors: educational and sanitary
infrastructures, aggregate income and demand for products and for labor, etc. It
may also reflect social interactions effects whereby neighbors in the same district
imitate each other in terms of schooling, child work or child care behaviors. Since
those are also affected by the cocoa crisis, the IV2 strategy should usually produce
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an overestimation of the private income effect, by attributing too much of the
variation in outcome to this latter variable. This is why we give our preference to
the within-village IV1 strategy.
6 Supporting Evidence for the Double-Difference Strat-
egy
We examine here whether other factors than income can plausibly have influ-
enced the evolution across time of the difference between children living in cocoa-
producing households and their non-cocoa counterparts.
6.1 Occupational Mobility and Sectoral Changes in Observables
Some households may have switched from cocoa to non-cocoa farming / non-
farming as a result of the price shock. In fact, such a move is unlikely in the short-
term since cocoa production imposes irreversible investments. A cocoa tree needs
3-5 years to produce cocoa beans, is mature after 7-10 years, and may live much
longer. Since cocoa prices were high before 1990, households who were producing
cocoa before 1990 are likely to have remained so in 1993. Anecdotal evidence from
the field says that many cocoa producers were waiting for a price upturn. Indeed,
the shares of cocoa and non-cocoa households in the total population kept stable
between 1988 and 1993: respectively 27.8 and 29.3 for cocoa households, 36.2 and
35.2 for non-cocoa agricultural households. We also calculated the share of cocoa
households in each village and checked the density distribution of this share did
not change between the two years (Figure 2).
We are nevertheless aware that such stability could hide some compositional
change within sectors. Table 2 compares mean characteristics between treatment
(cocoa producers) and control (other farmers) groups in 1988. A difference between
the two is a potential source of bias only if it is varies over time. Table 3 tests for
the existence of such variations within districts or within villages, for the sample
of children between 2 and 15 years of age. It reveals slight differential evolutions
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in observable variables, the most significant being the household head ageing and
the increased ownership of livestock in cocoa-producing households. When a non-
constant difference is observed, even at 10% confidence, we additionally control
for this variable in our IV1 regressions (column (5) of Table 5).
6.2 Selection and Fostering
Then, it could be that cocoa households have fostered more or less children in
1993 than in 1988, when compared to non-cocoa households. The 1986-88 surveys
contain a specific section dedicated to fostered children, from which we learn that
1 child in 3 is fostered and that children are 4 percentage points more likely to
be fostered when they are the offspring of cocoa-producing households’ members.
Yet, we cannot say whether this bias remains constant over time, since there is
no data about fostered children in 1993. Our identification strategies could then
be contaminated by the endogeneity of household composition. However, we first
restrict our analysis to 2-15 year-old children, which are less subject to fostering
than 16-18 year-old children (in 1988, the fostering rate is 22.6 for the former and
38.6 for the latter). Second, we examine whether children of cocoa households are
dynamically more likely to be born outside the district of residence, which could
indicate between-district fostering. We also check whether the likelihood of being
the head’s biological child dynamically varies with belonging to a cocoa household.
Table 3 confirms that if a change has occurred, it was a very slight one (see ”Was
not born in the district of residence” and ”Is the biological child of HH head”).
Lastly, let us point out that our IV2 strategy should not be contaminated by this
type of bias, as it corrects for endogenous migration by using cocoa specialization
in the district of birth as an instrumental variable.
7 Results
We estimate the household income effect under six model specifications, although
we do not consider that all of them provide a valid identification of the causal
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impact of family income. All the specification includes a full set of age and gen-
der dummies interacted with a dummy indicating whether the household produces
cocoa, as well as a set of district-time or village-time dummies. The seven specifica-
tions are the following (see table 5): OLS within-district (column 1), OLS-within
village (column 2), IV1-within-districts (column 3), IV1-within-village (column
4), IV1-within-village with additional controls (column 5), and IV2 using the di-
chotomy cocoa producing/non-producing districts plus the level and squared level
of cocoa production (column 6). We report the coefficient for the logarithm of per
capita consumption (pcc), our income measure; the list of additional controls is
given below each table (estimated coefficients for such variables are not reported
since they are not of primary interest, but they are available upon request). Table
4 provides a detailed example of the IV1-within-village and IV2 estimations in
the case of school enrollment, with the first stage in the bottom panel and the
second stage in the top panel. IV estimation is performed using the Generalized
Moments Method (GMM).7 Double Least-Squares (2SLS) were also tried and gave
similar results, even in terms of efficiency. For each IV regression, we report the
Kleibergen-Paap Wald rk F statistic which must be compared with the F statistic
Hausman, Stock and Yogo critical values to test for the weakness of instruments
(Hausman, Stock, and Yogo, 2005). Actually, our F statistic almost always passes
the 10% maximal IV bias size threshold. Lastly, we only report results for the
linear probability model, since IV-Probit or IV-Logit results are similar (but much
more time-consuming to perform with village-time fixed effects).
7.1 School Enrollment and Child Labor
We now describe the results of our estimations of the income effect for school en-
rollment and child labor. Regarding the former, we consider the sample of 5-11
year-old children, 5 being the theoretical age of entry in CP1 the first class of the
6 years of primary school cycle, and 11 being the theoretical age of termination
7IV estimators were calculated using Stata modules Ivreg2 and Xtivreg2 (Schaffer 2007).
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of this latter cycle. As for child work, we focus on 9-15 year-old children. First,
comparison of columns (1) and (2) vs. (3) and (4) confirms that OLS estimates
are downward biased. Second, comparison of columns (4) and (5) confirms that
our IV1-within-village results are robust to the inclusion of control variables whose
difference in means between the treatment group and the comparison group varies
across time. We also ran the same model using even more control variables (the list
is provided below table 5) but results were again unchanged (regression not shown
here but available upon request). Lastly, column (6) confirms that IV2 may lead
to overestimated income effects but IV1 and IV2 estimates are not significantly
different. To conclude, if we refer to the results from column (4), a 10% increase in
income leads to a 3.2 percentage points increase in school enrollment, and a 5.1 de-
crease in child labor. Then, our double-difference strategy leads to strong upward
revisions of the naive correlations between private income and child schooling or
child labor. These revisions stress the importance of downward bias affecting the
naive correlation. In the case of schooling and child labor, these potential sources
of downward bias have already been listed and discussed in section 2: in addition
to classical measurement errors and simultaneity bias, parents with informal skills
and higher income may prefer to train their children on the job rather than to send
them to school. It is also worth noting that such an upward revision is obtained
despite the counterbalancing force of the pure cocoa price effect.
7.2 Height Stature and Sickness
We now turn to our results for height-for-age Z-score and declared sickness (having
been sick or not in the previous month). For children of 2 to 5 years of age, we find
that a 10 % change in income leads to a 0.28 variation in Z-score, i.e. a variation
in height equivalent to 0.28 international standard deviations (column (4)). We
also directly analyzed height, controlling for age in months and gender, and results
were not altered: the equivalent variation in height corresponding to the same 10
% change in income is found to be around 1 centimer on average between 2 and
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5 years of age. Here, comparison of columns (1) and (2) vs. (3) and (4) confirm
our intuition that OLS very strongly underestimate the causal effect of income on
height stature or stunting in comparison of IV estimates, actually by a factor of
nine. We found no indication of weak instruments bias that could underlie this
result. Regarding declared sickness, we use the larger sample of 2-15 year-old
children and find in column (4) that a 10% fall in income leads to 3.8 percentage
points decrease in the likelihood to have been sick in the last month.
Here, the upward revision of OLS estimates is even stronger than in the case
of child schooling and child labor. In the case of declared sickness, it even modifies
the sign of the correlation; naive estimates are clearly flawed by a correlation of the
household income level with the parental assessment of children’s sickness status,
through a hypochondriac bias from the rich (over-reporting of sickness) that or
symmetrically some preference attrition from the poor (under-reporting), or even
the fact that the rich more often consult a doctor or more easily recognize symp-
toms. In the case of height, the IV estimate is ten times the OLS estimate. It is
however worth noting that this OLS estimate is itself very low, making poor chil-
dren almost as tall as wealthy children. However, this downward bias can not be
accounted for by the sole measurement errors. As it is also obtained with district
or village fixed effects, it can not either reflect reflect correlated variations in the
infectious environment or in local food quality, like for instance contrasts between
urban and rural areas. It rather implies that some factors positively correlated
with income have a negative impact on the protection against diseases or on the
quality of nutritional intakes, the two factors that are considered as most influential
for growth in stature at early ages. First, differential child mortality may induce a
survival bias that would select taller children among the poor (Deaton, 2007); the
cocoa income shock that we exploit would be high enough to dynamically impact
other factors of children’s stature, but not to significantly change the differential
mortality between the rich and the poor that prevails in the cross-sectional dimen-
sion of the data. Second, the rich may make nutritional choices that are not as
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beneficial as they could be, or even detrimental, to the growth of their children.
For instance, they may favor powdered milk over breastfeeding and industrial food
products over natural food products, although the latter are more nourishing than
the former. They may also buy much more expensive calories or proteins, so that
the caloric and proteinic intakes do not increase in proportion of income. For in-
stance, we could check in the surveys that the rich more often eat meat whereas
the poor more often eat fish: this kind difference in consumption basket should
not have any consequence on the quality of nutrition, as fish can bring as many
proteins as meat but are less expensive. We also find that the absolute consump-
tion levels of coarse cereals (the ”nutritious grain”) and fruits and vegetables only
slightly increase when income rises, indicating that households move from cheap
to expensive but ”tasty” calories as soon as their liquidity constraint looses (the
same phenomenon as described in India by Deaton and Dreze 2008).
8 A Supplement on Spatial Issues
Table 6 makes obvious that the income effect magnitude is influenced by the extent
to which some local factors are taken into account: except in the case of sickness
status, the pooled estimates tend to provide higher estimates of the impact of
income than within-village estimates, within-region and within-district estimates
standing in-between, even if the precision of these four estimates is most often not
high enough to detect statistically significant differences. The channel involved
may be the supply of local public goods and market or non-market social inter-
actions. This problem is apparently less an issue in the case of health outcomes,
maybe because local access to public health services is very limited and/or less de-
terminant for the health outcomes that are considered, so that only private income
matters.
8.1 Robustness Checks for Changes in the Village Samples
One can question whether our within-districts or within-villages estimates could be
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affected by the draws of survey clusters (primary sampling units) in the first stage
of the sample design. Indeed, these surveys are not meant to be representative
at the district level, and they do not provide either a panel of villages (clusters).
Because of changes in the sample designs, we have indeed far more villages in 1993
than in 1988 and their spatial distribution may slightly differ across the two years.
To assess the potential influence of these changes, we implement a few robustness
checks. First, we drop districts for which we only have data in 1993. Second, we
omit districts for which we have at least three times more villages in 1993 than
in 1988. Third, we only keep villages that can be matched with a close enough
village in the other year; we successively use 100, 50, 20 and even 10 kilometers as a
distance threshold. In every case, IV1 point estimates are not altered, even if they
are less precisely estimated as the number of observations decreases. Regarding
the IV2 strategy, we check that results are not driven by individual districts: we
try the same regression first without Abidjan, then without the western border
districts, last without the eastern border districts. Results are again unchanged.
8.2 A Local Treatment Effect Interpretation of the Impact of Spatial
Disaggregation
All our estimates are better seen as local average treatment effects (LATE),
in the terminology of Angrist and Imbens (1995). The latter show that two-stage
least squares instrumental variable estimations mechanically overweight the causal
effect for those subgroups (here, income quantiles) that are the most affected by
the instrument (here, by the double difference between cocoa-producers and other
farmers). As the impact of family income on children outcomes is not necessarily
the same at each quantile of the income distribution, one may wonder whether
various IV estimates capture the same local effect of income. From this standpoint,
the difference between our IV estimates at each level of spatial disaggregation
would not only stem from the presence of contextual effects but also from distinct
weighing schemes across the income distribution. Figure 4 plots double-differences
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in income cumulative distribution functions (CDFs) for the four different levels of
spatial disaggregation. It indeed reveals that the four estimates do not manipulate
the same parts of the income distribution. Of course they do not manipulate the
same amount either: cocoa producers lose more when they are compared with
the whole sample of other farmers than when they are compared only with their
neighbors. This is why it is useful to compare each double difference in CDF with
a ”uniform counterfactual”, which we simulated by applying the same average
change in mean to the income distribution observed in the 1986-88 sample of
cocoa and non-cocoa farmers. Figure 5 provides the comparisons between the
actual double-difference and the uniform simple difference in CDFs. In the end,
both Figure 4 and Figure 5 show that pooled IV tends to overweight the bottom
of the farmers income distribution whereas the within-villages IV places more
weight at the top. Then, if only for school enrollment and child labor, part of the
explanation for the differences between the four IV estimates presented in Table 6
could stem from the combination of two basic features: (i) they are local average
treatment effects that do not manipulate the same parts of the income distribution;
(ii) income elasticities school enrollment and/or child labor are higher (in absolute
value) in the lower part of the distribution (among the poor) than in the upper
part.8 Whereas the bias linked to contextual effects should lead us to prefer the
highest level of spatial disaggregation (the village level), the local character of
each estimate would lead us to value each of them equitably for not estimating
the same weighted average of income elasticities. Of course, it is impossible for us
8One question is then why the manipulation of fixed effects allows us to exhibit those het-
erogeneous effects. A plausible explanation would be that the introduction of disaggregate fixed
effects would select poor non-cocoa farmers that would have been relatively more affected by the
loss of income of their cocoa neighbors and additionally affected by low prices and / or yields
for their own culture (coffee producers in particular). Conversely, disregarding local effects gives
more weight to the comparison of the poor cocoa farmers with poor non-cocoa farmers that were
little affected over the period (especially cotton farmers in the more northern regions and staple
producers close to urban areas).
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to discriminate between the two potential explanations we have just given for the
observed heterogeneity of the family income effect; as they are not incompatible,
they may also share responsibility.
9 Conclusion
We study the drastic cut of the administered cocoa producer price in 1990
Cote d’Ivoire and look at the extent to which cocoa producers’ children suffered
from this severe income shock in terms of school enrollment, increased labor, height
stature and sickness. Comparing pre-crisis (1986-88) data and post-crisis (1993)
data, we propose a difference-in-difference within-village strategy in order to iden-
tify the causal effect of family income on children outcomes, whereby we compare
the evolution of outcomes of children living in cocoa producing households with
that of children living in other agricultural households of the same village. A sec-
ond identification strategy exploits the weight of cocoa production in the district
of birth of the children. With both strategies, we find a strong and significant
impact of family income for the four variables we examine.
In comparison with the previous literature, we believe that our analysis of-
fers several advantages. First, we exploit a negative income shock, for which no
randomized experimental data will ever exist. Second, we not only examine child
schooling and child labor, but also child care and child health, which are under-
represented issues in the literature, especially in African countries. Third, using
good microeconomic data on income, we are able to derive direct estimates of the
causal effect of family income on children education and health. Fourth, we show
that instrumenting with aggregate shocks may underestimate or overestimate the
individual income effect, since contextual effects are not accounted for, hence our
preference for the within-village strategy. Fifth, we indeed confirm that naive OLS
estimation tends to underestimate the effect of household income. Sixth, our anal-
ysis of local average treatment effects exhibits the possible heterogeneity of income
effects along the income distribution.
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African economies remain little diversified and vulnerable to changing in-
ternational prices for their exports. In Cote d’Ivoire, a considerable part of the
population still works in the agricultural sector, and directly undergoes the fluctu-
ations of international prices. By the past, the national marketing board and price
stabilization fund for cocoa and coffee, the Caisstab, did not really served its orig-
inal mission; it was dismantled in 1998. Nevertheless, new insurance schemes and
safety nets could be invented to protect households and children from unexpected
shocks on income. If one believes in the income elasticities presented in this study,
the transposition of conditional transfer programs already implemented in Latin
America could deserve some attention, and could constitute a very defendable use
of foreign aid money.
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Figure 1: National Cocoa Producer Prices and Average Per Capita Consumption for
Cocoa Producers and Non-Cocoa Farmers (Base 100 = Per Capita Consumption for
Cocoa Households in 1988).
Sources: Berthe´lemy and Bourguignon 1996, World Bank 2001, IMF 2007. Authors’ calculations.
Figure 2: Kernel Density of the Share of Cocoa Producers Within Villages where
this Share is Positive.
Population covered: 2 to 15 years old children.
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Figure 3: Average Cocoa Production by District in 1987-1988-1989 and Occupational
Specialization of Surveyed Villages in 1986-1988 and 1993.
Reading: Light Grey Areas = no cocoa production, Dark Grey Areas = low density of cocoa production, Black
Areas = high density of cocoa production. Production expressed in thousands of tonnes of cocoa beans per squared
kilometer. Sources: CSSPPA (1990), DCGTx (1995). Authors’ calculations. Lozenges = cocoa producers are the
most numerous group in the village, Squares = non-cocoa farmers are, Circles = non-agricultural households are.
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Figure 4: Difference-in-Difference in Income CDFs for 5-11 y.o. Children.
Figure 5: Actual and Simulated (Uniform Shock) Difference-in-Difference in In-
come CDFs for 5-11 y.o. Children (NW: pooled, NE: within-region, SW: within-
district, SE: within-village).
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Table 1: Results for the Reduced-Form Model, School Enrollment (School 5-11), Child
Labor (Work 9-15), Height-for-Age Z-score (HAZ 2-5) and Health Status (Sick 2-15).
Cocoa producers vs. non-cocoa farmers, in 1993 vs. 1988
Pooled Within-District Within-Village
Cocoa93, s.e. Cocoa93, s.e. Cocoa93, s.e.
School 5-11 -0.120** 0.017 -0.063** 0.021 -0.050** 0.024
Work 9-15 0.205** 0.02 0.088** 0.023 0.058** 0.027
ZHA 2-5 -0.574** 0.105 -0.392** 0.126 -0.404** 0.154
Sick 2-15 0.0389** 0.01 0.026** 0.013 0.044** 0.015
pcc 2-15 -0.146** 0.015 -0.125** 0.019 -0.117** 0.021
Regressions: OLS, pooled or within-district/village (including time-district or time-village fixed effects), robust
to heteroscedasticity, including Nagri, Nagri1993, dummies for age, gender and cocoa specialization and their
multiple interactions as well as time dummies for pooled regressions. pcc: log of per capita consumption. Obs.
5-11: 20657, 9-15: 17829, 2-5: 8764, 2-15: 39123. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10 %.
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Table 2: Mean Characteristics for 2-15 y.o. Children for Cocoa Producers and Non-
Cocoa Farmers, in 1988.
Non-Cocoa Cocoa
Age 7.915 8.113**
Sex 0.534 0.551*
Was born out of Ivory Coast 0.007 0.008
Was not born in the district of residence 0.140 0.109**
Is the biological child of HH head 0.698 0.744**
Size of the HH 10.08 10.9**
Age of HH head 50.24 50.77**
HH head is a woman 0.079 0.026**
HH head has ever been to school 0.175 0.267**
HH head has at least achieved prim. school 0.112 0.159**
HH owns livestock 0.654 0.608**
HH head has migrated in the last 3 years. 0.065 0.041**
HH head was born out of Ivory Coast 0.071 0.137**
Obs. 2-15: 39123. Stars indicate whether means between cocoa producers and other farmers are stastically
significant. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%.
Table 3: Relative 1988-1993 Change in Observables for 2-15 y.o. Children between
Cocoa Producers and Non-Cocoa Farmers.
Within-district Within-village
Cocoa93 s.e. Cocoa93 s.e.
Age -0.227 0.144 0.075 0.167
Sex -0.013 0.018 -0.004 0.022
Was born out of Ivory Coast -0.001 0.004 -0.003 0.005
Was not born in the district of residence -0.007 0.013 0.023 0.014
Is the biological child of HH head -0.024 0.015 -0.009 0.017
Size of the HH -0.185 0.156 -0.007 0.163
Age of HH head 1.696** 0.441 3.925** 0.497
HH head is a woman -0.006 0.010 -0.020* 0.011
HH head has ever been to school -0.005 0.016 -0.021 0.018
HH head has at least achieved prim. school -0.002 0.014 -0.018 0.016
HH owns livestock 0.037** 0.016 0.053** 0.018
HH head has migrated in the last 3 years. -0.004 0.009 0.000 0.011
HH head was born out of Ivory Coast -0.040** 0.013 0.023 0.015
Regressions: OLS-within-district/village (including time-district or time-village fixed effects), robust to het-
eroscedasticity. Obs. 2-15: 39123. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10 %.
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Table 4: IV1 and IV2 Second-Stage and First-Stage Results for School Enrollment, 5-11
y.o. Children.
School 5-11 (5) (6)
Second-stage Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
pcc 0.305* 0.169 0.414** 0.094
Cocoa 0.000 0.027
Cocoa density > 0 -0.039* 0.023
Cocoa density -0.010 0.010
Cocoa density2 0.001 0.001
Was born out of Ivory Coast -0.150** 0.026 -0.079** 0.032
Was not born in the district of residence 0.001 0.013 -0.025 0.015
Is the biological child of HH head 0.058** 0.011 0.039 0.009
Age of HH head 0.004 0.003 0.007** 0.002
Age2 of HH head 0.000 0.000 0.000** 0.000
HH head is a woman 0.023* 0.012 0.024** 0.015
HH head has ever been to school 0.054** 0.017 0.082** 0.020
HH head has at least achieved prim. school 0.051* 0.028 0.029 0.033
HH owns livestock -0.017 0.015 -0.016 0.016
HH head has migrated in the last 3 years. -0.039** 0.017 -0.015 0.015
HH head was born out of Ivory Coast -0.087** 0.029 -0.092** 0.010
Non-agricultural HH -0.006 0.040
Non-agricultural HH in 1993 -0.002 0.026
First-stage Coeff. s.e. Coeff. s.e.
Cocoa93 -0.141** 0.028
Cocoa 0.174** 0.037
Cocoa density93 > 0 -0.241** 0.030
Cocoa density93 0.042** 0.008
Cocoa density932 -0.002** 0.001
Cocoa density > 0 0.085* 0.046
Cocoa density 0.072** 0.006
Cocoa density2 -0.005** 0.000
Was born out of Ivory Coast 0.024 0.033 0.179** 0.042
Was not born in the district of residence 0.048** 0.012 0.121** 0.013
Is the biological child of HH head 0.038** 0.010 -0.003 0.012
Age of HH head -0.010** 0.002 -0.003 0.003
Age2 of HH head 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000
HH head is a woman -0.003 0.016 0.080** 0.019
HH head has ever been to school 0.046** 0.017 0.131** 0.021
HH head has at least achieved prim. school 0.139** 0.018 0.304** 0.022
HH owns livestock 0.074** 0.011 -0.150** 0.010
HH head has migrated in the last 3 years. 0.069** 0.017 0.070** 0.019
HH head was born out of Ivory Coast -0.158** 0.013 -0.036** 0.012
Non-agricultural HH 0.244** 0.024
Non-agricultural HH in 1993 -0.122** 0.029
IV F-stat 25.43 21.66
Columns: (5) IV1-within-village, (6) IV2 with cocoa density > 0, cocoa density and cocoa density squared. Non-
reported controls: dummies for age, gender and cocoa specialization and their multiple interactions, and time
dummies for IV2 regressions. pcc: log of per capita consumption. Obs. 5-11: 20657. ** significant at 5%, *
significant at 10 %.
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Table 5: Results for School Enrollment (School 5-11), Child Labor (Work 9-15), Height-
for-Age Z-score (HAZ 2-5), and Health Status (Sick 2-15).
School 5-11 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcc 0.148** 0.115** 0.429** 0.322** 0.305* 0.414**
s.e. 0.006 0.006 0.152 0.158 0.168 0.094
IV F-stat 30.53 27.47 25.43 21.66
Work 9-15 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcc -0.061** -0.041** -0.593** -0.508** -0.464** -0.662**
s.e. 0.005 0.006 0.178 0.257 0.235 0.4
IV F-stat 26.75 12.75 15.71 13.06
HAZ 2-5 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcc 0.295** 0.187** 2.838** 2.805** 3.628** 2.113**
s.e. 0.035 0.038 1.152 1.305 1.741 0.761
IV F-stat 12.58 10.24 7.55 7.20
Sick 2-15 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
pcc 0.02** 0.013** -0.213** -0.381** -0.431** -0.606**
s.e. 0.003 0.004 0.108 0.146 0.158 0.086
IV F-stat 41.85 31.03 28.89 33.36
Columns: (1) OLS-within-district, (2) OLS-within-village, (3) IV1-within-district, (4) IV1-within-village; (1) to
(4) models include dummies for age, gender and cocoa specialization and their multiple interactions (in the case
of height-for-age Z-score, only dummies for cocoa specialization and the interactions between age in months and
gender) plus Nagri and Nagri1993; (5) IV1-within-village with additional controls (list provided below); (6) IV2
with cocoa density > 0, cocoa density and cocoa density squared. First set of additional controls: age and age
squared of the household head, dummies variables for the child was not born in Ivory Coast, for the household
head was not born in Ivory Coast, is a woman, has ever been to school, has achieved at least primary schooling,
and for the household owns livestock. Second set of additional controls (regression not shown): is the youngest
child, is the youngest boy, was not born in the region of residence, household owns a business, number of household
head spouses, head or spouse is a civil servant, head has migrated in the last year, head’s main ethnical group
and main religion, number of rooms in the accommodation, access to water, access to electricity, household owns
a bicycle, household owns a radio. pcc: log of per capita consumption. Obs. 5-11: 20657, 9-15: 17829, 2-5: 8764,
2-15: 39123. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10 %.
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Table 6: IV1 Results for School Enrollment (School 5-11), Child Labor (Work 9-15),
Height-for-Age Z-score (HAZ 2-5) and Health Status (Sick 2-15) according to the Spatial
Disaggregation of Fixed Effects.
IV-pooled IV-within-
region
IV-within-
district
IV-within-
village
School 5-11 (1) (2) (3) (4)
pcc 0.793** 0.539** 0.429** 0.322**
s.e. 0.15 0.197 0.152 0.158
Work 9-15 (1) (2) (3) (4)
pcc -1.349** -1.518** -0.593** -0.508**
s.e. 0.232 0.431 0.178 0.257
HAZ 2-5 (1) (2) (3) (4)
pcc 3.961** 3.683* 2.838** 2.805**
s.e. 1.137 1.522 1.152 1.305
Sick 2-15 (1) (2) (3) (4)
pcc -0.291** -0.211** -0.213** -0.381**
s.e. 0.079 0.129 0.108 0.146
Columns: (1) IV1, (2) IV1-within-region (including time-region fixed effects), (3) IV1-within-district (including
time-district fixed effects), (4) IV1-within-village (including time-village fixed effects). (1) to (4) models include
dummies for age, gender and cocoa specialization and their multiple interactions Obs. 5-11: 20657, 9-15: 17829,
2-5: 8764, 2-15: 39123. pcc: log of per capita consumption. ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10 %.
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APPENDIX 1: Schooling and Health in Cote d’Ivoire: Facts
Cote d’Ivoire, like its neighboring Western African countries, is a demographically young
country to the extent that the share of children aged 0 to 14 is high in the total population:
46.1% (UN 2007). The Ivorian educational system proposes the following curriculum: from 5 to
11, ”e´cole primaire”, from 12 to 15, ”colle`ge”, from 16 to 18, ”lyce´e” (high school), and from
19, ”universite´”. Actually, children enter rather late into the first grade of primary schooling
(”Cours Pre´paratoire 1e`re anne´e”, CP1). In our specific sample, the average entry age into
primary schooling is 7.33 (and not 5 as in theory). Girls seem to enter slightly sooner than boys
(6.93 vs 7.61 for the latter). Then, less than half of children attend primary schooling, and even
less achieve the full cycle. In our 1988 sample, amongst the children aged 9 to 15, 50% only
attend school, 3.6% both attend school and work, and 25.4% only work. As for nutritional and
mortality indicators, Cote d’Ivoire performs rather well in comparison with other West African
countries, even if this country is the West African country where the AIDS epidemics is the most
widespread.
Table 7: Investments in Education and Health for Five West African Countries
Burkina-
Faso
Cote
d’Ivoire
Ghana Guinea Mali
Net primary education enrolment ratio, 1990
(%)
26.2 45.6 52.4 25.5 20.4
Completion rate of primary schooling, 1991
(%)
21.3 43.4 62.8 16.8 10.8
Completion rate of primary schooling, girls
only, 1991 (%)
16.1 32.2 54.9 9.1 8.5
Percentage of pupils starting grade 1 and
reaching grade 5, 1991
69.7 72.5 80.5 58.6 69.7
% of children under 5 who are stunted 43.1
(2003)
31.5
(1999)
35.6
(2003)
39.3
(2005)
42.7
(2001)
% of children under 5 who are underweight 35.2
(2003)
18.2
(1999)
18.8
(2003)
22.5
(2005)
30.1
(2001)
% of newborns with low birth weight, 2002 19 17 11 12 23
Under-5 mortality rate (per 1000 live births),
1990
210 157 122 240 250
Children under 5 years of age with diarrhoea
who received oral rehydratation therapy (%)
62.8
(2004)
66.1
(2000)
63.3
(2004)
56.7
(2005)
65.7
(2002)
Children under 5 years of age with acute
respiratory infection and fever taken to
facility (%)
32.6
(2004)
34.9
(2000)
44
(2004)
34.5
(2005)
42.8
(2002)
Sources: UN, 2007 and WHO, 2007
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